Engaging the Muslim World

As I consider Juan Cole’s latest book, Engaging the Muslim World, I cannot help but review it in light of the 2009 Fortune 500 list of top global companies, released this week. My local paper—The Straits Times—sees the Fortune list as a chance to promote two Singaporean companies that made the cut, hail the increase in Chinese corporations in the rankings, and highlight the fall of US firms. Wal-Mart no longer tops the list, and the number of US companies ranked is the lowest it has ever been. I cannot help but notice that seven of the top ten Fortune 500 firms are petro-chemical companies and that the other three (Wal-Mart, ING, and Toyota) are only one degree of separation from hydrocarbon industries. The connection between Fortune’s list and Cole’s book is clear: it’s about the oil and natural gas, stupid.

In Engaging the Muslim World, Cole (professor of history at the University of Michigan, President of the Global Americana Institute, and blogger of Informed Comment) combines in-depth analyses of historical developments and international relations with clear evaluations of the contemporary energy situation, global climate change predictions, and the potential trajectories of encounters between North Atlantic and Muslim States. Anyone who has seen Cole’s previous work (including juancole.com, columns at salon.com, Sacred Space and Holy War (2002) and Napoleon’s Egypt: Invading the Middle East (2007)) knows that his knowledge of the languages, politics, and people of the Middle East is exceptional. He has lived there, studied there, and written about the area for over forty years, and he brings his extensive experience to bear well in this book.

Rather than see the current global situation as a clash of civilizations, Cole frames the contemporary world in terms of two anxieties. The first, Islam Anxiety, is what Westerners feel when they worry about “terrorism, intolerance, and immigration” (1). The second, America Anxiety, is what Muslims experience when they worry about “neoimperialism, ridicule, and discrimination” (1). Both anxieties have some credence, he admits, but too often they have been grounded in crass suspicions and misunderstandings that have provoked cyclical violence, economic collapse, and ecological disaster rather than solve the problems these two worlds face together. (He notes that they are not, in fact, even “two worlds” but one.) In this book, his goals are to clarify the dangers of the present “stand off” (3), articulate the differences between political Islam and radical extremism (which has little to nothing to do with the Muslim religion, which disdains violence as much as most other world religions), and provide specific recommendations for engaging the Muslim world (through dialogue and critique, respect and pressure, diplomacy and intervention) rather than pursuing the already failed policies of containment and control.

Although the book begins with a balanced perspective—attempting to address both anxieties, Cole is clearly writing from a personal, American point of view for an American audience, especially the new administration in Washington, which he says, “now has an opportunity to abandon ‘containment’ as a goal and turn instead to engagement” (151). Cole maps the failures of major US policies toward the Middle East, exhibiting a special disdain for Bush-Cheney blunders after September 11, 2001. He most often cites recent European and multinational collaborations as more responsive and fruitful and argues that contemporary cooperative developments within and interventions across the Middle East (such as Qatar’s recent role in Lebanon) may provide models for future tactics. In this way, Cole shows that the US does not need to run the show in the Middle East but might better alleviate both anxieties by carefully loosening its grip on the region.

Cole argues for a better understanding of the Muslim perspective on current affairs and corrects a good deal of propaganda about the Middle East and its peoples. He explains that contemporary struggles across the Muslim world have more to do with economic and environmental issues than any static Islamic ideology. They are not primitive fundamentalist extremists, a new Soviet-style bloc, nor a burgeoning Fascist axis. He compares contemporary activist parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to the conservative Republican base in the US. He describes the similarities between some minority extremist jihadists and the Red Brigades or Baader-Meinhof group. He notes that Bin Laden might be seen as “a wealthy and much better organized version of Timothy McVeigh” (83). In discussing Wahabbism, he describes how this “austere puritanism and harsh regimentation” (83) has affected Saudi Arabia (which Eisenhower positioned as the spiritual leader of the Middle East) much differently than the more tolerant and “laid back” (109) Qatar—the world’s other Wahabbi State and home of Al-Jazeera satellite television. In fact, in their beliefs in tradition and suspicion of innovation, Cole asserts, we might see many similarities between Wahabbis and Mennonites or the Amish in America.

The war in Iraq was founded on fear mongering and lies and has led to the destabilization of that country, the loss of 300,000-1,000,000 lives, and an immense refugee problem both internally and externally. According to Cole, the US presence there is increasing the possibility of this multi-ethnic State succumbing to separatist movements that could fracture it further along Kurdish, Sunni Arab, and Shiite lines. This breakup would be disastrous for the entire region. His answer is that an orderly withdrawal of US troops from Iraq and the refusal to maintain permanent bases in that country are the best approaches for reducing Islam Anxiety and America Anxiety. Likewise, when he discusses Pakistan and Afghanistan, Cole emphasizes the multiplicities of their languages, religions, and populations and points out a difficult complexity that must be addressed between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Namely, “the Pakistani military plays the double game of fighting Pakistani Taliban and al-Qaeda on Pakistani soil, while at the same time giving aid to Afghan Pushtuns fighting an insurgency against the United States, NATO, and Karzai. They see the Taliban as an avenue for the possible reestablishment of Pakistani hegemony over its northern neighbor and thus a means of pushing Indian influence out of Afghanistan” (185). This situation is, however, an economic rather than religious one, according to Cole, and the people of the region have already stated what would alleviate both anxieties: less military aid and support and more civilian aid and support. The Pakistani and Afghani peoples have asked for hospitals, schools, business investment, alternative agricultural models to replace the poppy economy, openness and more access to visas and travel to North Atlantic States. The way not to repeat the errors of empires that have gone to Afghanistan to die is not to repeat the imperial actions of the past and the conquest and control tactics of the present.

In the most insightful and authoritative chapter of the book, Cole writes about Iran and Shiite activism around the Muslim world, primarily to address two questions: who speaks for Iran and how should we see the connections between Iran, Lebanon, Palestine, and Israel. According to Cole, most of what the mainstream press and conservative politicians report on or claim about Iran is inaccurate. Iran is not developing nuclear weapons, but needs to look to alternative energies because it already consumes half the oil it produces. Iran, which has the second highest population of Jews in the Middle East and Jewish and Christian representatives in its parliament, is not trying to destroy Israel. To help us understand this further, Cole spends several pages correcting the “obviously extremely inexact and misleading” (201) mistranslation and misunderstanding of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s 2005 quoting of Ruhollah Khomeini’s saying from the 1980s. Cole questions why Khomeini’s words, “This Occupation regime over Jerusalem must vanish from the page of time,” have been mistranslated and disseminated as “Israel must be wiped off the face of the map” in many sources. (This move, of course, recalls the need in 1956 to better understand Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s “My vas pokhoronim!/We will bury you!” remark to Western officials.) Furthermore, Cole reminds us that Iranian President Ahmadinejad serves at the pleasure of the Supreme Jurisprudent Ali Khameni and does not control military or energy policy. Despite the international press’s attentions, Ahmadinejad’s sometimes bizarre statements represent only a minority view within the Iranian population and have little real authority. Cole also explains why it is illogical that Iran, a Shiite State, would want to undermine the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government. What Iran does feel threatened by is the proximity of the American presence. Addressing as well the Shiite Iranian support of Hizbullah and Hamas, Cole describes the complexity of the situation caused by these organizations simultaneously providing political, social, and armed support to local populations. He admits the legitimate concern these complications must cause the North Atlantic States. However, he also points out that a different configuration of US policy toward Lebanon, Israel, and Palestine—one closer to the developing European one—and a different approach by Israel toward Syria and its other neighbors could lessen many tensions. The most effective practices for the United States are for it to provide more support for Israeli cooperation and negotiation and for it to pursue a “patient diplomacy” toward Iran (235). These moves might push Hizbullah and Hamas further into the political and social arenas, and further from the martial one, and help further alleviate anxieties on all sides.

In the conclusion, Cole summarizes his position regarding the intersections of Islam Anxiety, America Anxiety, a growing demand for energy, and the threat of global climate change. Moving from a polar, confrontational world view toward a collaborative, cooperative one where all sides engage with one another against containment and control seems the best route to addressing the fundamentalism and vigilantism driven by the two anxieties and the needs we all face.

This is the strength of Cole’s book and the promise it offers—that through diplomacy, compromise, and engagement—along sometimes very specific lines—the North Atlantic States and Muslim World might come to a better living arrangement. I would argue with little here. (Some of Cole’s statements regarding women, foreign workers, and the State monopoly on violence do call for more explanation, though.) Overall, Cole expertly explains the historical, political, social, and religious contexts of current affairs—often arguing that Islam is a second or third tier concern for many actors in the Middle East—economic and national sovereignty issues seem to dominate. (As others have pointed out, some of these explanations could be bolstered by more complete documentation.) He recommends specific practices to the United States and other actors. In the end, he shows us the root causes behind the contemporary situation and maps out strategies we should follow to address them effectively. As good as it is, though, two problems remain with Engaging the Muslim World: Cole’s too-narrow scope when considering “the Muslim world” and his too-narrow focus in addressing issues he considers pertinent to it.

First, this book considers only a small slice of the Muslim world. Where is Indonesia? Turkey? Albania? Sudan? North Cyprus? France? The United States? All of these countries have significant Muslim populations or are in the midst of crucial debates regarding secular/Muslim issues but little to no place in this book. Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world. Turkey is 99% Muslim and borders both Iran and Iraq. The central question in Turkey today is how to continue to balance its secularism and drive for European Union membership with its resurgent indigenous Islamic political movements, brought to the fore by the popularity of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul’s AKP (Justice and Development Party). France, which has the highest Muslim population in Western Europe, is wrestling with this same balance between secularism and religion in social, gendered, and economic realms. In France, the headscarf issue is religious, gendered, and economic. Finally, considering Muslim-America as another site where Islam Anxiety and America Anxiety intersect would remind us again that Islam is not “over there,” a separate world, but a part of the one we share. In a book written by an American for an American audience, this matters.

Second, in this book Cole addresses charges (often grossly inaccurate) made by neo-conservative and reactionary voices against Islam and the Muslim world. He adroitly responds to these charges to offer corrections and alternatives. Thus, he is able to articulate the complexities of concerns behind Islam Anxiety and explain how much of the current situation is economic and nationalistic rather than religious or ideological. However, this tack leaves unasked and unaddressed many questions regarding America Anxiety. There remain national, religious, and cultural issues that do not revolve around oil or natural gas. Whither the Cyprus problem, Kurdistan, religious autonomy concerns, migrant worker issues, gender and sexuality laws, or concerns over media and the arts beyond Al-Jazeera? (How might Americans react to something like Jasad Magazine, a quarterly journal on the body published in Beirut Lebanon?) Comment on these points would demonstrate even more the dynamic and complex situation behind these anxieties. These are concerns that especially need to be explained to an American readership to contextualize both anxieties. Cole has aimed too low by avoiding these discussions and leaves America Anxiety under analyzed.

Cole’s approach is to offer a rationalist, Statist, stabilizing voice against the war-mongering destabilizing cries of the neo-conservatives. His book is clear and concise. Everyone who feels anxious about contemporary world affairs should read this book. Everyone who wants a more thoughtful history of what happened should read this book. Everyone who is concerned about oil, natural gas, global climate change, and the make-up of the Fortune 500 list should read this book. It is an appropriate answer to previous US foreign policy and the recent Bush-Cheney atrocities. Yet, it remains incomplete (perhaps simply too short at barely 250 pages), and I look forward to Cole’s next book, written after Obama-Lieberman have raised the bar for us all.